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Germany’s vision of the European Union is decidedly not one of a “Britainless 
Europe.” But the new coalition government in Berlin is faced with a dilemma. 
In the coming months Germany will have to continue devoting a great deal of its 
energ y to eurozone reform. Even with a limited approach, the German govern-
ment will contribute to widening the gaps between the “ins” and “outs” of the 
Economic and Monetary Union. Berlin is therefore heading toward a choice that 
it would rather not make: between a more integrated eurozone and a wider Union 
in which all member states can find their places. This is a predicament that policy 
makers in Berlin are increasingly aware of. To avoid such a choice, Germany and 
Britain need to find common ground in the discussion of how the eurozone and 
the wider EU can be reconciled with one another.
Eine EU ohne Großbritannien?
Die deutsche Sicht
von Almut Möller
Deutschlands Vision für die EU schließt Großbritannien nicht aus. Die neue 
Koalitionsregierung in Berlin steht jedoch vor einem Dilemma. In den nächsten 
Monaten wird Berlin weiter viel Energie aufwenden müssen, um die Eurozone 
zu reformieren. Auch mit einem zaghaften Ansatz wird die deutsche Regierung 
dabei zur Verbreiterung der Kluft zwischen den Mitgliedern der Wirtschafts- 
und Währungsunion und den Nicht-Euro-Ländern beitragen. Berlin bewegt sich 
auf  eine unliebsame Entscheidung zu: zwischen einer tiefer integrierten Euro-
zone und einer Union, in der alle Mitgliedsstaaten ihren Platz finden – eine 
Zwangslage, der sich Berliner Entscheidungsträger zunehmend bewusst sind. Um 
eine solche Entscheidung zu vermeiden, müssen Deutschland und Großbritan-
nien eine gemeinsame Grundlage finden, wie man die Eurozone und die Union 
als Ganzes auch in Zukunft in Einklang bringen kann.
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Britain outside the EU?
The German View
by Almut Möller
Berlin would rather not have a British in/out ques-
tion added to its already packed EU agenda. While 
David Cameron’s speech in January 2013 did 
resonate with some in the German political arena, 
the attitude so far has been “let’s cross that bridge 
when we come to it.” If and when a UK in/out 
referendum happens—and whether it will result in 
Britain leaving the Union—is held to be a subject 
of speculation. There is a feeling in Berlin that 
London might need to face a fundamental choice 
about its EU membership—and a move that either 
leads to Britain staying in or getting out might 
turn out to be cathartic. Berlin believes its lever-
age on British public and stakeholders’ opinions is 
limited, as is Germany’s desire to offer tailor-made 
solutions for London to help it win its domestic 
campaign for Europe. Despite this, Germany’s 
vision of the Union is not one of a “Britainless 
Europe.” This presents the new coalition govern-
ment in Berlin with a dilemma.
In the coming months Berlin will have to continue 
devoting a great deal of its energy to eurozone 
reform. The agreement founding the new Ger-
man coalition government suggests that the grand 
coalition of Angela Merkel’s Christian Demo-
cratic Union (CDU), its Bavarian sister party the 
Christian Social Union (CSU), and the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) is likely to take a cautious 
approach toward further integration of the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (EMU). But even with 
a limited approach, the German government will 
contribute to widening the gaps between the “ins” 
and “outs” of the eurozone. Berlin is therefore 
heading toward a choice that it would rather not 
make: between a more integrated eurozone and a 
wider Union in which all member states can find 
their place—a predicament that policy makers in 
Berlin are increasingly aware of. To avoid such a 
choice, Germany and Britain need to find com-
mon ground in the discussion of how the eurozone 
and the wider Union can be reconciled with one 
another.
Britain as a European Power, 
Germany as an EU Power
Germany has an interest in strong cooperation 
with Britain, in particular with regard to London’s 
global ambitions. London is seen as a powerful 
ally in shaping Europe’s opportunities in a global-
izing world. Angela Merkel’s vision of the EU is 
not inward looking but instead focuses on a future 
global role for Europe, with Germany a central 
figure. Trade, innovation, competitiveness, and 
a willingness to embrace the promises of global-
ization are often cited as strong bridges between 
Britain and Germany in Europe. While it is often 
overlooked in Britain that Germany, even under 
a conservative chancellor, remains committed to 
a social market economy, there is still room for 
cooperation on an outward looking economic 
agenda. With regard to European security, there is 
little doubt in Berlin that the British contribution 
is vital, otherwise Germany would be under even 
more pressure to contribute more to EU defense 
and security.
An argument often heard in Germany is that 
an EU without Britain would result in a shift of 
power within the Union toward France and the 
southern countries, a development detrimental to 
Berlin’s interests. Yet, Britain’s potential role as a 
spoiler within the Union is something that also 
worries Berlin. In particular there are concerns 
that a renegotiated UK-EU relationship would 
lead to other member states adopting a cherry 
picking approach to membership. If Germany is 
faced with a British “no” vote, it will have to find 
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new ways to work with Britain as a European 
power, but it would do so while remaining com-
mitted to EU interests. It is not clear whether both 
approaches are reconcilable.
Competing Visions over the Notion 
of EU Membership
Even with an increasingly global outlook and grow-
ing confidence in shaping the eurozone according 
to its own preferences, Germany continues to focus 
on the economic health of all members of the euro-
zone. This is seen as a necessity for the German 
economic model with its strong focus on exports. 
Berlin has to consider its fellow eurozone members, 
both in terms of the substance of German policies 
and the style it adopts in negotiations. The 2009–13 
coalition government of Chancellor Merkel argu-
ably did not always get the intra-eurozone com-
munication right. The vital eurozone interests lead 
Germany to carefully weigh its priorities, and makes 
it especially perceptive to intended or unintended 
spoilers. For now, the so-far opaque British claim 
for “less Europe” is being largely ignored as Merkel 
and her new coalition continue to shape their ideas 
for “more Europe” within the eurozone. But if Lon-
don’s claims infringe on Germany’s vital interests, 
Berlin is likely to side with the eurozone. As much 
as Berlin might wish for German and British agen-
das to be reconcilable under the EU umbrella, this 
might be too difficult. Saving the eurozone through 
further integration may come at the price of losing 
Britain and weakening the wider EU.
Britain as a Spoiler or Partner?
Policy makers in Berlin are well aware of the often-
fierce debates in Britain about the EU. Berlin 
acknowledges that the nature of EU membership is 
again changing with the need to further integrate 
the eurozone and understands that these develop-
ments run counter to British preferences. The Ger-
man government itself faces domestic challenges 
over Europe and understands the challenges of 
navigating public opinion. For now, however, the 
German domestic front seems peaceful. In the 
September 2013 elections, a majority of Germans 
demonstrated that they trust Merkel’s abilities to 
manage the eurozone crisis. However, it is ques-
tionable whether the German public is aware of 
the fundamental choices on economic and social 
policies that are currently being discussed as part 
of efforts to save the euro, since the previous gov-
ernment and most of the opposition parties largely 
shied away from public debate on these choices.
What is noted with surprise in Berlin is that while 
Germany has become more pragmatic toward 
EU affairs and more outward looking, the British 
debate appears to have become more ideological, 
less pragmatic, and more inward looking. Policy 
makers in Berlin are having trouble reading Lon-
don’s signals and wonder where Britain is headed. 
A wave of visits by officials and politicians from 
London, not all of them proving successful, has 
not added clarity. Despite some problems and 
remaining hesitancy, Berlin has gained confidence 
in leading EU debates, and as a result expects to 
be challenged over its European policies. However, 
there is a limited appetite for conversations with 
British visitors who seem to suffer from a funda-
mental lack of understanding of the German posi-
tion and the wider debate elsewhere in the EU.
London has to work harder to establish itself as 
a credible voice in the debate over EU reform 
and demonstrate that it is not acting purely out 
of national self-interest. This relates both to the 
British government’s ongoing “Balance of Com-
petences Review” and the wider reform agenda 
that Cameron outlined in his January 2013 Europe 
speech. While Germany has a tradition of discuss-
ing subsidiarity—and therefore potentially has a 
lot to contribute to a competence debate (especially 
given its powerful federal states)—the timing of 
the initiative was met with indignation in Berlin. 
It was seen as a rather divisive exercise at a time 
when Germany was investing a lot of energy into 
fighting centrifugal forces within the EU. To Ger-
man ears it sounds rather strange to hear from 
Britain that the EU needs to reform. Berlin has 
spent four years heavily engaged in EU reform, or 
more precisely, eurozone reform. From a Berlin 
point of view, ideas on how to bridge the widening 
gaps between the “ins” and “outs” of the eurozone 
would be more useful than stirring up the sensitive 
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question of competences as the British “Balance of 
Competences Review” does.
The “eurozone”/“non-eurozone” division will 
increasingly shape British-German relations in the 
EU. Britain and Germany will have to find a joint 
agenda that allows them to bridge the widening 
gaps. This cooperation could form part of a posi-
tive agenda for the British government as it cam-
paigns in any British in/out referendum.
A Britainless EU—What Would it 
Mean for Germany?
An EU without Britain is not in Germany’s inter-
est. Even the process of disengagement would be 
messy. The negotiations for withdrawal would not 
only be legally challenging, they would absorb a 
lot of political energy, especially from Germany, 
which would likely play a central role in negotia-
tions. A British withdrawal would have spillover 
effects not only on a number of EU policies but 
on fundamental debates over the future path 
of the EU. Having invested a lot of energy and 
resources into saving the eurozone from col-
lapse, Berlin would find itself confronted with yet 
another period of EU change and reform—and 
one that, unlike eurozone reform, would be largely 
beyond its control.
A British exit would also mean the loss of one of 
the EU’s most ambitious international and military 
players. If the EU continues to build its own for-
eign and security policies, then Germany would be 
increasingly pressed by Paris, Warsaw, and others 
to do a lot more to compensate for Britain leaving 
these structures.
Finally, Germany would have to continue to 
engage Britain as a non-EU member. A major 
European country would find itself placed outside 
of the Union’s institutions, procedures, and many 
if not all of its legal arrangements. Ironically, in 
continuing to engage with London, Berlin risks 
weakening the institutions and structures of the 
Union on which it places such great emphasis.
Berlin, however, would be well-advised to prepare 
for such a prospect.
Almut Möller is head of the Alfred von Oppenheim 
Center for European Policy Studies at the German 
Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).
This article is one in an ongoing series on 
“Britainless Europe,” edited by Almut Möller and 
Tim Oliver, published with the IP Journal. You may 
also want to read the introduction to the series as 
well as other views on the website of IP Journal.
